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Cantrell: Fourth Amendment Seizure - Getting Cuffed and Stuffed for Not Wea

CASE NOTES
FOURTH AMENDMENT

SEIZURE-Getting "Cuffed and

Stuffed" for Not Wearing a Seat Belt. Atwater v. City of
Lago Vista, 121 S. Ct. 1536 (2001).
INTRODUCTION

On March 26, 1997, Gail Atwater was driving her two children,
ages three and five, home from soccer practice when, along the way, the
children realized that one of their favorite toys had fallen out of the truck
window onto the street. I Atwater turned the truck around and retraced
her route to the soccer field in search of the toy.2 Though the children
were previously wearing seat belts, Atwater let them remove their seat
belts so they could look out the truck's windows for their lost toy.3 In the
course of the children's search, Ms. Atwater passed Officer Bart Turek,
a city police officer, who observed that neither Ms. Atwater nor her children were wearing seat belts and stopped them for violating the Texas
seat belt law.4

Following the stop, Turek approached Ms. Atwater's truck and

1. Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 121 S. Ct. 1536, 1541 (2001); Brief for Petitioner
at 2, Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 121 S. Ct. 1536 (2001) (No. 99-1408) [hereinafter
Petitioner's Brief]. These are the facts as alleged by Atwater. Because the case below
was dismissed pursuant to a motion for summary judgment filed by respondent, the
United States Supreme Court views the facts in the light most favorable to Atwater. See
FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c).
2. Petitioner's Brief, supra note 1, at 2.
3. Petitioner's Brief, supra note 1, at 2.
4.
Atwater, 121 S. Ct. at 1541; Petitioner's Brief, supra note I, at 2-3. With respect
to the seat belt law, the Court explains as follows:
In Texas, if a car is equipped with safety belts, a front-seat passenger
must wear one, Tex. Tran.Code Ann. [sic] § 545.413(a) (1999), and
the driver must secure any small child riding in front, § 545.413(b).
Violation of either provision is 'a misdemeanor punishable by a fine
not less than $25 or more than $50.' § 545.413(d). Texas law expressly authorizes '[a]ny peace officer [to] arrest without warrant a
person found committing a violation' of these seatbelt laws, §
543.001, although it permits police to issue citations in lieu of arrest,
§§ 543.003-543.005.
Atwater, 121 S. Ct. at 1541 (alteration in original).
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began yelling at her and jabbing his finger in her face. 5 Turek screamed
either that they had met before or that they had had this conversation
before.6 Turek's conduct frightened the children; when they began to
cry, Ms. Atwater calmly asked Turek to lower his voice.7 He responded
by informing her that she was "going to jail."8 When Turek's continued
verbal abuse caused the children to become increasingly frightened and
distressed, Ms. Atwater asked to take them to a nearby friend's house
before going to the police station.9 Turek told her she was "not going
anywhere,"' and said he would take the children into custody as well."
However, a friend arrived in time
to prevent the children from being
2
taken to jail with their mother.'
Once the children were gone, Turek "handcuffed Atwater,
placed her in his squad car, and drove her to the local police station,
where booking officers had her remove her shoes, jewelry, and eyeglasses, and empty her pockets."' 3 After her "mug shot" was taken, officers placed Ms. Atwater in a jail cell for approximately one hour until
she was taken before a magistrate. 4 She was released on $310 bond.' 5
Ultimately, Ms. Atwater pled no contest to the6 seat belt violation and
paid the maximum penalty-a fifty dollar fine.'
Following this incident, Ms. Atwater filed suit in a Texas state
court against Turek, Police Chief Frank Miller, and the City of Lago
5. Atwater, 121 S. Ct. at 1541; Petitioner's Brief, supra note 1, at 3.
6. Petitioner's Brief, supra note I, at 3. Officer Turek had stopped Atwater several
months prior to her arrest for failure to have her youngest son properly restrained in the
vehicle. Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 165 F.3d 380, 382 (5th Cir. 1999). See Atwater
v. City of Lago Vista, 121 S. Ct. 1536, 1541 n.1 (2001). However, the seat belt was
properly fastened and Atwater received no citation. Atwater, 165 F.3d at 382.
7. Petitioner's Brief, supra note I, at 3.
8. Atwater, 121 S. Ct. at 1565 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); Petitioner's Brief, supra
note 1,at 3.
9. Atwater, 121 S. Ct. at 1565 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); Petitioner's Brief, supra
note 1, at 4.
10. Atwater, 121 S. Ct. at 1542; Petitioner's Brief, supra note 1, at 4.
11. Atwater, 121 S. Ct. at 1565 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); Petitioner's Brief, supra
note I, at 4.
12. Atwater, 121 S. Ct. at 1565 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
13. Id. at 1542; Petitioner's Brief, supra note 1, at 4. Interestingly, the dissent points
out that Officer Turek failed to secure Atwater in her seat belt for the ride to the police
station. Atwater, 121 S. Ct. at 1565 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). However, Texas law did
not require such action. See, e.g., TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 545.413(a) (1999).
14. Atwater, 121 S. Ct. at 1542; Petitioner's Brief, supra note 1, at 5.
15. Atwater, 121 S.Ct. at 1542; Petitioner's Brief, supra note 1, at 5.
16. Atwater, 121 S. Ct. at 1542; Petitioner's Brief, supra note I, at 5. In addition to
the fine, Atwater was required to pay more $110 to get her vehicle out of the police
impound in another city after an inventory search had been conducted. Id. at 29.
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Vista, alleging inter alia that the arrest violated her Fourth Amendment
rights.1 7 Ms. Atwater sought compensatory and punitive damages. 8 The
city removed the suit to the United States District Court for the Western
District of Texas and filed a motion for summary judgment. 9 Because
Ms. Atwater admitted to violating the Texas seat belt law, and because
the court did not find that she was harmed or detained in an unreasonable
manner, the court granted the city's motion for summary judgment.2 ° On
appeal, a panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's ruling.2' The Fifth Circuit panel held
that, although based upon probable cause, Turek's actions in this case
were not constitutionally reasonable.2 2 Subsequently, the Fifth Circuit,
sitting en banc, vacated the panel's decision and reinstated the district
court's ruling on the city's motion for summary judgment.23 The Court
of Appeals held, "[W]hen probable cause exists to believe that a suspect
is committing an offense, the government's interests in enforcing its
laws outweigh the suspect's privacy interests, and an arrest of the suspect is reasonable. 24 In addition, the court concluded that no evidence
suggested that Turek "conducted the arrest in an 'extraordinary manner,
unusually harmful' to Atwater's privacy interests. 2 5
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari "to consider whether the Fourth Amendment, either by incorporating commonlaw restrictions on misdemeanor arrests or otherwise, limits police officers' authority to arrest without warrant for minor criminal offenses. 26
In a five-to-four decision, the Court affirmed the Fifth Circuit's en banc
judgment and applied the standard of probable cause to all arrests without a need to balance the interests and circumstances of the particular
parties involved.27 Accordingly, an officer having probable cause "to
believe that an individual has committed even a very minor criminal
offense in his presence . . . " may arrest without violating the Fourth
Amendment.28
This case note will discuss why the bright-line rule issued by
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

Atwater, 121 S. Ct. at 1542. Atwater filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id.
Atwater, 121 S.Ct. at 1542.
Id.
Id.
Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 165 F.3d 380, 388 (5th Cir. 1999).
Id. at 389.
Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 195 F.3d 242, 246 (5th Cir. 1999) (en banc).
Id. at 244 (citation omitted).
Id. at 246 (citing Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 818 (1996)).
Atwater v. City of Lago Vista 121 S. Ct. 1536, 1542-43 (2001).
Id. at 1557.
Id.
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the United States Supreme Court in Atwater v. City of Lago Vista was
inappropriate. In discussing the inappropriateness of the Atwater rule,
this case note will examine whether probable cause alone is sufficient to
justify a warrantless arrest for a minor criminal offense, or whether, in
addition to probable cause, the arrest must satisfy some standard of reasonableness. Finally, this case note will analyze how the Atwater rule
may affect the future of Fourth Amendment law in areas such as rovingpatrol stops, checkpoints, impermissible pretextual stops, and searches
incident to citation.
BACKGROUND

The Fourth Amendment, made applicable to the states by the
Fourteenth Amendment, provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by
Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.2 a
Probable Cause
The Supreme Court has frequently described the Fourth Amendment probable cause requirement as a flexible standard:
It merely requires that the facts available to the officer
would warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief
that certain items may be contraband or stolen property
or useful as evidence of a crime; it does not demand any
showing that such a belief be correct or more likely true
than false.3 °
"In dealing with probable cause .

..

we deal with probabilities.

These are not technical; they are the factual and practical considerations
29.

U.S. CONST. amend. IV.

30.

Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 742 (1983) (internal quotations and citation

omitted). See Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1949). The Brinegar

court explained that "[p]robable cause exists where 'the facts and circumstances within.
. (the officers') knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information
(are) sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that'
an offense has been or is being committed." Id. (quoting Carroll v. United States, 267
U.S. 132, 162 (1925)).
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of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act.",3 1 With respect to the sufficiency of information required to
satisfy a probable cause standard, the Court has explained that "sufficient probability, not certainty, is the touchstone of reasonableness under
the Fourth Amendment .... Information sufficient to warrant probable cause can be acquired through a number of ways, including an informant's tip confirmed by independent police work,33 collective knowledge of all law enforcement officers involved in an investigation,3 4 and
plain view. 35 Probable cause may also be acquired if the offense is committed in the officer's presence.3 6
The Reasonableness Requirement
Although the United States Supreme Court requires probable
cause to make a warrantless arrest, the Court has traditionally required
that in addition to probable cause, the arrest must also be reasonable. In
Welsh v. Wisconsin, the Court explained that an important requirement in
determining whether exigent circumstances justify a warrantless Fourth
Amendment arrest is the severity of the underlying offense.3 7 The Welsh
court was called upon to decide whether the Fourth Amendment prohibits police from entering a person's home without a warrant to arrest him
for a fine-only traffic offense. a
One night, an eyewitness observed Edward Welsh driving apparently under the influence of an intoxicant. 39 After Welsh ran his car off
the road, he left the scene before officers could arrive. 4 ° When officers
checked the vehicle's registration, they learned that Welsh lived nearby
31.
Brinegar, 338 U.S. at 175.
32.
Hill v. California, 401 U.S. 797, 804 (1971).
33. See, e.g., United States v. Dawkins, 17 F.3d 399 (D.C. Cir. 1994); United States
v. Reyes, 792 F.2d 536 (5th Cir. 1986).
34.
United States v. Morales, 238 F.3d 952 (8th Cir. 2001); United States v. Kirk,
781 F.2d 1498 (11 th Cir. 1986); United States v. McCoy, 478 F.2d 176 (10th Cir. 1973).
35.
Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366 (1993).
36. See, e.g., Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980); United States v. Watson,
423 U.S. 411 (1976); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948); Carroll v. United
States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925); John Bad Elk v. United States, 177 U.S. 529 (1900).
37. 466 U.S. 740, 753 (1984). See also McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451,
459-60 (1948) (Jackson, J., concurring) (requiring that the nature of a warrantless
Fourth Amendment seizure be proportional to the severity of the offense, the presence
of violence or the threat of violence, and danger to life or security).
38.
Welsh, 466 U.S. at 742.
39. Id. Welsh was observed changing speeds, veering from side to side until he
finally ran off the road and stopped in a field. Id. After conversing with Welsh following the accident, the eyewitness concluded that Welsh was either drunk or very sick. Id.
40.

Id.
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and presumed that he had walked home.4 Without obtaining a warrant,
officers then went to Welsh's home and, when his stepdaughter answered the door, gained entry into the home.42 Officers then proceeded
upstairs, found Welsh lying on his bed, and arrested him for driving
while intoxicated.4 3
The Welsh court began its analysis by repeating a basic principle
of Fourth Amendment law that warrantless seizures inside a home are
presumptively unreasonable. 44 The Court reiterated that exigent circumstances must be present, in addition to probable cause, to justify a warrantless arrest in the home.45 When the government seeks to conduct a
warrantless Fourth Amendment seizure in the home, the Court explained,
it bears a heavy burden:
[T]o demonstrate exigent circumstances that overcome
the presumption of unreasonableness . . . . When the
government's interest is only to arrest for a minor offense, that presumption of unreasonableness is difficult
to rebut, and the government usually should be allowed
to make such arrests only with a warrant issued upon
probable cause by a neutral and detached magistrate.46
Thus, the Court drew the line for permissible warrantless arrests in the
home at extremely minor offenses. 47 The Supreme Court found it difficult to imagine any reasonable warrantless arrest in the home when the
underlying offense is very minor.48
The government attempted to justify Welsh's warrantless ar41.
Id.
42. Id. at 743.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 749. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980).
45.
Welsh, 466 U.S. at 749; Payton, 445 U.S. at 583-90. See also United States v.
Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 42-43 (1976) (applying the hot-pursuit exception as the only recognized exigent circumstance for warrantless felony arrests in the home).
46. Welsh, 466 U.S. at 750.
47.
Id. at 753. With respect to warrantless arrests in the home for misdemeanors, the
Court stated:
[A]lthough no exigency is created simply because there is probable cause to
believe that a serious crime has been committed, . . . application of the exigent-circumstances exception in the context of a home entry should rarely be
sanctioned when there is probable cause to believe that only a minor offense,
such as the kind at issue in this case, has been committed.

Id.
48.

Welsh, 466 U.S. at 753.
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rest, citing the hot-pursuit exception, threat to public safety, and the need
to preserve evidence. 49 The Supreme Court dismissed the state's hotpursuit and threat-to-public-safety justifications.50 With respect to the
need to preserve evidence, the Court explained that by itself such a need
does not justify a warrantless arrest in the home."' According to the
Court, the best indication of the government's interest in effecting a warrantless home arrest lies in the state's classification of the underlying
offense for which an arrest is sought.f 2 In other words, as the severity of
the punishment decreases, so does the state's interest in effecting a warrantless arrest in the home. In this case, because Wisconsin classified a
first drunk driving offense as a fine-only offense, the state's interest in
conducting a warrantless home arrest to preserve evidence was very
slight when compared with the protections afforded Welsh by the Fourth
Amendment. 3 Thus, Welsh's5 4arrest was the unconstitutional result of
unreasonable police behavior.
The principles of reasonableness were extended as the United
States Supreme Court, in Tennessee v. Garner, considered the importance of how a seizure is made under the Fourth Amendment." In Garner, police officers responded to a "prowler inside call" in the middle of
the night.16 Upon arriving at the house, one of the officers saw someone
running across the backyard. 7 When the suspect stopped at a six-feethigh chain link fence, the officer, aided by a flashlight, saw that Garner
was unarmed.58 While Garner was still crouched at the base of the fence,
the officer took a few steps toward him and commanded him to stop.5 9
As Garner began to climb the fence, the officer, fearing that Garner
60
would escape, pulled his gun and shot him in the back of the head.
From Garner's dead body, officers recovered ten dollars and a purse
taken from the house.6'

49. Id.
50.
Id.
51.
Id. at 753-54.
52.
Id. at 754.
53.
Id.
54. Id.
55.
471 U.S. 1 (1985).
56.
Id. at 3.
57.
Id.
58.
Id.
59.
Id. at 4.
60. Id. Edward Garner was 15 years old, measured 5'4" tall, and weighed between
100 and 110 pounds. Id. at 4 n. 2. The officer who shot Garner acted under the authority
of a Tennessee statute and pursuant to police department policy. Id. at 4. See TENN.
CODE. ANN. § 40-7-108 (1982).
61.
Garner, 471 U.S. at 4.
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The Garner court acknowledged that "[a] police officer may arrest a person if he has probable cause to believe that person committed a
crime. 62 However, the Court explained that the constitutionality of the
arrest depends on the outcome of balancing the "nature and quality of
the intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against the
importance of the governmental interests alleged to justify the intrusion., 63 For the Garner court, the balancing of these competing interests
was the key principle of the Fourth Amendment. 64 The Supreme Court
explained that extent of the "intrusion" is one of the necessary factors to
determine the nature and quality of an intrusion. 6' Thus, the reasonableness of an arrest depends not only on when a seizure is made but also
66
upon how the seizure is carried out.
In essence, the reasonableness of a particular seizure depends on
whether it was justified by the totality of the circumstances.6 7 Following
a balancing of competing interests, the Garner court concluded that the
state's interest in "shooting nondangerous fleeing suspects [does not]
outweigh the suspect's interest in his own life ....It is not better that all
felony suspects die than that they escape. 68 In summary, the Court determined that where a fleeing suspect poses no immediate threat to the
safety of the officer and no threat to others, the use of deadly force to
apprehend the suspect is constitutionally unreasonable.6 9
Though the Supreme Court in Garner applied the reasonableness
standard in the context of felony arrests, the Court expanded this standard's application in Graham v. Connor.70 The Graham court likewise
dealt with a claim that law enforcement officials used excessive force in
the course of making a Fourth Amendment seizure. 7' When Dethorne
Graham, a diabetic, felt the onset of an insulin reaction, he asked a
friend to drive him to a nearby convenience store so he could purchase
some orange juice to counteract the reaction.7 2 When Graham ran into

62.

Id. at 7.

63. Id. at 7-8 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
64. idat 8. Accord Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 700 n. 12 (1981); Camara v.
Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 536-37 (1967).
65.
Garner,471 U.S. at 8.
66. Id. Accord United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 895 (1975); Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1, 28-29 (1968).
67.
Garner,471 U.S. at 8-9.
68.
Id. at 11.
69.
Id.
70.
490 U.S. 386 (1989).
71.
Id. at 388.
72.

Id.
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the store, he noticed a long line at the checkout counter.7 3 Rather than
wait, he ran out of the store and asked his friend to drive him to another
friend's house nearby.7 4 Officer Connor witnessed these events, became
suspicious, and followed the car in which Graham was riding.7 5
Approximately one-half mile from the convenience store, Officer
Connor made an investigative stop. 76 Graham's friend told Officer Con-

nor that Graham was merely suffering from an insulin reaction and
needed sugar.7 7 Officer Connor, however, ordered Graham to wait at the
car until he found out what had happened at the convenience store.78
Graham got out of the car, ran around it twice, and passed out on the
curb. 79 "In the ensuing confusion, a number of other ...officers arrived
on the scene in response to Officer Connor's request for backup., 80 After
one of the officers handcuffed Graham's hands tightly behind his back, a
number of officers carried Graham over to the car and placed him face
down on its hood. 8' According to the Court:
Regaining consciousness, Graham asked officers to
check in his wallet for the diabetic decal that he carried.
In response, one of the officers told him to 'shut up' and
shoved his face down against the hood of the car. Four
officers grabbed Graham and threw him headfirst into the
police car. A friend of Graham's brought some orange
juice to the car, but the officers refused to let him have it.
Finally, Officer Connor received a report that Graham
had done nothing wrong at the convenience store, and the
officers drove him home and released him.82
During the course of events, Graham sustained a broken foot, cuts on his
wrists, a bruised forehead, an injured shoulder, and developed a loud
ringing in his right ear.83
In addressing whether the officers' use of force to detain Graham
was excessive, the Supreme Court applied the balancing test announced
73.

Id.

74.

Id. at 389.
Id.
Id.

75.

76.
77.
78.

Id.

79.

Id.

80.

Id.

81.
82.

Id.
Id.

83.

Id. at 390.

Id.
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8 4 Citing Terry v. Ohio, the Graham court made clear that the
in Garner.
use or threat of using some degree of physical force is necessary at times
in order to make an arrest or investigatory stop. 85 Because the reasonableness test is incapable of precise definition, its proper application
requires determining whether the totality of the circumstances warrants a
particular seizure. 86 Such circumstances include the severity of the
crime, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the
officer or others, and whether the suspect is actively resisting arrest or
attempting to evade arrest by flight.87 In addition, the Court explained
that some allowance must be made for the fact that police officers are
often forced to make split-second judgments-in circumstances that are
tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving-about the amount of force that is
necessary in a particular situation.8 8 Finally, the Court inquired as to
whether the officers' actions were objectively reasonable in light of the
facts and circumstances confronting them.89 Following its promulgation
of the reasonableness test, the Supreme Court vacated the Court of Appeals' decision, and remanded the case to it for consideration of the issues under that test. 90

WarrantlessArrests
As a general rule, warrantless searches and seizures are per se
unreasonable and officers are encouraged to obtain an arrest warrant
prior to making an arrest. 91 Yet the law acknowledges specific instances
when based on probable cause an officer may make a warrantless arrest
of an individual suspected of committing a criminal offense. For instance, an officer may make a warrantless felony arrest, even absent exigent circumstances, if the officer has probable cause to believe that the
arrestee committed the underlying offense.9 1 Though the felony offense

84.

Id. at 396.

85.

Id.

86.

Id.

87.
Id.
88.
Id. at 396-97.
89.
Id. at 397.
90.
Id. at 399.
91.
See, e.g., Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 372 (1993).
92.
See, e.g., United States v. Reid, 226 F.3d 1020, 1027-28 (9th Cir. 2000) (defining exigent circumstances as those in which a substantial risk of harm to the persons
involved or to the law enforcement process would arise if the police were to delay a
search until a warrant could be obtained). Accord United States v. Hudson, 100 F.3d
1409, 1417 (9th Cir. 1996); United States v. Stewart, 867 F.2d 581, 584 (10th Cir.
1989). But see United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 42-43 (1976) (applying the hot
pursuit exception as the only exigent circumstance recognized by the Court for warrantless arrests in the home).
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need not occur in the officer's presence,9 3 a warrantless felony arrest
must occur in a public place where the suspect has a diminished expectation of privacy.94
Although a warrantless felony arrest may occur regardless of
whether the officer witnessed the offense, the law differs with respect to
misdemeanors. The Supreme Court has consistently described the common law rule regarding warrantless misdemeanor arrests as permissible
95
if the offense is committed in the officer's presence.
See, e.g., Florida v. White, 526 U.S. 559, 565-66 (1999) (requiring a warrantless
93.
felony arrest to occur in a public place); United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 424-25
(1976) (upholding Postal Service officers' warrantless arrest in a public place of an
individual suspected of committing a felony where the arrest was based upon probable
cause).
In South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976), the concept of diminished
94.
expectation of privacy was explained in terms of an automobile. The Court explains that
"warrantless examinations of automobiles have been upheld in circumstances in which a
[b]ecause the expectation of privacy with
search of a home or office would not ....
respect to one's automobile is significantly less than that relating to one's home or office." Id. at 367. Unlike homes, the Court explains:
Automobiles . . . are subjected to pervasive and continuing governmental

regulation and controls, including periodic inspection and licensing requirements. As an everyday occurrence, police stop and examine vehicles when license plates or inspection stickers have expired, or if other violations, such as
exhaust fumes or excessive noise, are noted, or if headlights or other safety
equipment are not in proper working order.
Id. at 368. See also Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 588-89 (1980) (holding that a
warrantless entry into the suspect's home for a routine felony arrest violates the Fourth
Amendment in the absence of valid or exigent circumstances because of the special
protection individuals enjoy in their homes); Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590
(1974) (holding that the expectation of privacy as to automobiles is further diminished
by the public nature of automobile travel, whereby the automobile's occupants and
contents are in plain view).
See, e.g., Payton, 445 U.S. at 590 n.30 (explaining that "cases construing the
95.
Fourth Amendment thus reflect the ancient common-law rule that a peace officer was
permitted to arrest without a warrant for a misdemeanor or felony committed in his
presence .... ); United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411,418 (1976); Johnson v. United
States, 333 U.S. 10, 15 (1948); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 156 (1925) ("The
usual rule is that a police officer ... may only arrest without a warrant one guilty of a
misdemeanor if committed in his presence."); John Bad Elk v. United States, 177 U.S.
529, 534 (1900) ("[A]n officer, at common law, was not authorized to make an arrest
without a warrant, for a mere misdemeanor not committed in his presence."). See Brief
for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 18-24, Atwater v.
City of Lago Vista, 121 S. Ct. 1536 (2001) (No. 99-1408). Accord United States v.
Reed, 220 F.3d 476, 478-79 (6th Cir. 2000); Hutton v. Strickland, 919 F.2d 1531, 1539
(11th Cir. 1990); Bodzin v. City of Dallas, 768 F.2d 722, 724 (5th Cir. 1985); United
States v. Williams, 754 F.2d 1001, 1002 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (per curiam); Hart v. Walker,
720 F.2d 1436, 1439 (5th Cir. 1983). For an excellent discussion of the meaning of"in
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Prior to its decision in Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, the Supreme Court had never addressed the constitutionality of a warrantless
arrest for minor traffic offenses. In Gustafson v. Florida,a police officer
arrested James Gustafson for failure to have his driver's license in his
possession while driving. 96 Following the arrest, the officer conducted a
full-scale body search and discovered marijuana cigarettes.9 7 Rather than
challenge the constitutionality of an arrest for a minor traffic violation,
Gustafson contended that a search incident to such an arrest violated the
Fourth Amendment.9" Citing United States v. Robinson,9 9 the Supreme
Court rejected Gustafson's claim and held:
[I]t is the fact of the lawful arrest which establishes the
authority to search, and ... in the case of a lawful custodial arrest a full search of the person is not only an exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth
Amendment, but it is also a 'reasonable' search under
that Amendment. °°
However, in his concurring opinion, Justice Stewart stated that "a persuasive claim might have been made in this case that the custodial arrest
of the petitioner for a minor traffic offense violated his rights under the
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments." 10 1
Search Incident to a Lawful CustodialArrest
Although prior to Atwater v. City of Lago Vista the Supreme
Court had remained virtually silent with respect to the lawfulness of a
custodial arrest for minor traffic offenses, its recent decisions have indicated strong approval of a warrantless search incident to a custodial ar-

the officer's presence," see WAYNE R. LAFAVE, JEROLD H. ISRAEL & NANCY J.

KING, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 3.5(a), at 180 (3d. ed. 2000).
96.
414 U.S. 260, 262 (1973).
97.

Id. at 262-63.

98.
Id. at 263.
99.
414 U.S. 218 (1973). In Robinson, the Court held that a crumpled cigarette
package located during a search incident to an arrest was admissible as evidence. Id. at
235.
According to the Court, the authority to search incident to arrest does not hinge
upon the probability that the search will produce weapons or evidence. Id. The fact that
the search was conducted incident to a lawful arrest satisfies the Fourth Amendment's
reasonable requirement. Id.
100.
Gustafson, 414 U.S. at 263-64 (quoting Robinson, 414 U.S. at 235) (omission in
original).
101.
Id. at 266-67 (Stewart, J., concurring). See Brief Amicus Curiae of Americans
for Effective Law Enforcement, Inc. at 10, Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 121 S. Ct.
1536 (2001) (99-1408).
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rest following a stop for traffic violations. In a situation similar to that in
Gustafson, the Court in Whren v. United States addressed whether the
Fourth Amendment permits a police officer to stop and temporarily detain a motorist who the officer has probable cause to believe has
committed a traffic violation. 10 2 In Whren, police officers patrolling a
high drug area of the District of Columbia stopped a vehicle they had
been observing after the driver sped off at an unreasonable speed.' °3
When officers approached the vehicle and looked in through the
windows, they saw within plastic bags filled with what appeared to be
drugs.' 4 Officers then arrested the occupants of the vehicle, and, in the
search that followed, found quantities of several types of drugs.'0 °
Michael Whren challenged the constitutionality of the stop, acknowledging that although the officers had probable cause to stop the
vehicle, probable cause is not enough to justify a search in the context of
traffic violations. 0 6 Because traffic violations are so pervasive, he argued, police officers could use a traffic stop as a means of investigating
other crimes for which officers have no reasonable suspicion, let alone
probable cause.'0 7 Such stops, Whren argued, could be based on impermissible pretextual factors, such as race.'0 8 To remedy such concerns,
Whren proposed a subjective reasonableness requirement: In addition to
probable cause, an officer cannot justify a traffic stop unless, acting reasonably, he would have made the stop for the reason given.' 0 9
The Supreme Court, however, was unmoved by Whren's position. The Court stated that while automobile stops are subject to the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment, that requirement is
met when police stop an automobile with probable cause to believe that a
traffic violation has occurred.'" Citing various prior decisions, the Court
rejected Whren's subjective test and dismissed his contention that "the
constitutional reasonableness of traffic stops depends on the actual motivations of the individual officers involved."'' The Court further refused
Whren's invitation to establish a balancing test weighing the governmental and individual interests implicated in a traffic stop. 1 2 The Court ex102.
103.

104.
105.
106.
107.

108.
109.
110.
Ill.
112.

517 U.S. 806, 808 (1996).
Id. Of interest, the facts do not allege that Whren was speeding.
Id. at 808-09.
Id. at 809.
Id. at 810.
Id.
Id. Both petitioners in this case were black. Id.
Id.

Id.
Id. at 813.

Id. at 816.
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plained:
It is of course true that in principle every Fourth
Amendment case, since it turns upon a "reasonableness"
determination, involves a balancing of all relevant factors. With rare exceptions not applicable here, however,
the result of that balancing is not in doubt where the...
seizure is based upon probable cause.13
The Court held that where probable cause exists to effect a
Fourth Amendment seizure, no balancing test is needed unless the seizure was "conducted in an extraordinary manner, unusually harmful to
the individual's privacy or ... physical interests .... ,, In summary,
the Whren court concluded that "probable cause to believe that petitioners had violated the traffic code ... rendered the stop reasonable under
the Fourth Amendment . ,,. 15 The decision in Whren is important because it clarifies the constitutional authority of police officers with respect to traffic violations. However, it is significant to note that the
Whren court dealt only with the constitutionality of a traffic stop and
subsequent evidence obtained through the "plain view" exception and
the search that followed.' 1 6
In Arkansas v. Sullivan, the Court compared the warrantless
search following the traffic stop in Whren v. United States to the inven-

113.

Id. at 817.
Id. at 818.
115.
Id. at 819.
116.
In Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128 (1990), the United States Supreme Court
characterized the plain view exception as follows:
114.

It is, of course, an essential predicate to any valid warrantless seizure of in-

criminating evidence that the officer did not violate the Fourth Amendment in
arriving at the place from which the evidence could be plainly viewed. There
are, moreover, two additional conditions that must be satisfied to justify [a]
warrantless seizure. First, not only must the item be in plain view; its incriminating character must also be immediately apparent. .

.

. Second, not

only must the officer be lawfully located in the place from which the object
can be plainly seen, but he or she must also have a lawful right of access to
the object itself.
Id. at 136-37 (internal quotations and citation omitted). In essence, if the officer was
behaving legally when he saw the evidence, and if he is legally in a place where he can
gain physical control over the evidence, he can seize it if he has probable cause. Id. But
see Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 328 (1987) (holding that although search for weapons and shooter was a lawful objective for entry into apartment, lifting stereo equipment
to record serial numbers based on suspicion, not probable cause, that the equipment was
stolen constituted a separate, unlawful search).
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tory search following an arrest for a traffic violation that was the subject
of Sullivan.'17 In Arkansas v. Sullivan, Kenneth Sullivan was stopped for
speeding and for having an improperly tinted windshield." 8 Following
the stop, the officer requested Sullivan's license, registration, and proof
of insurance."9 When the officer saw Sullivan's license, he realized that
Sullivan was suspected of narcotics activity.' 20 As Sullivan opened his
car door in an unsuccessful attempt to locate his registration and proof of
insurance, the officer noticed a rusted roofing hatchet on the floor.' 2 ' He
then arrested Sullivan for speeding, driving without proof of registration
and insurance, improper window tinting, and carrying a weapon.' 22 Then,
on the roadside, the 23officer conducted an inventory search which produced illegal drugs.'
The Arkansas Supreme Court held that, though supported by
probable cause, Sullivan's arrest "nonetheless violated the Fourth
Amendment because [the officer] had an improper subjective motivation
for making the stop.' 24 The United States Supreme Court rejected the
Arkansas Supreme Court's holding as inconsistent with the holdings in
Whren and Atwater. 125 The Supreme Court explained that in Whren, it
was "'unwilling[] to entertain Fourth Amendment challenges based on
the actual motivations of individual officers,"' and that "'[s]ubjective
intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment
analysis."",126 The Supreme Court sustained Sullivan's arrest and subsequent search as consistent with precedent.'2 7 In commenting on the similarities between the facts in Whren and those in Sullivan, the Sullivan
court stated, "That Whren involved a traffic stop, rather than a custodial
,,12 In Whren, the search took
arrest, is of no particular moment ...
place following the traffic stop when, after approaching the vehicle, the
officer saw drugs in the vehicle. 29 This observation gave the officer
probable cause to search the rest of the vehicle for drugs. In Sullivan, the°
arrest. 1
inventory search was conducted pursuant to a lawful custodial

118.

121 S. Ct. 1876 (2001) (per curiam).
Id. at 1877.

119.

Id.

120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

Id.

117.

Id.
Id.

Id.
Id.at 1878.
Id.

127.

Id. (quoting Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996)).
Sullivan, 121 S. Ct. at 1878.

128.

Id.

129.

Whren, 517 U.S. at 808-09.
Sullivan, 121 S. Ct. at 1877.

130.
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Thus, regardless of the nature of the seizure, the warrantless search following the seizure was conducted in a manner consistent with Fourth
Amendment requirements.
This principle is further fortified by the Court's holding in New
York v. Belton.'3 ' Roger Belton was one of four occupants of a vehicle
stopped for speeding. 3 2 Following the stop, the officer had probable
cause to arrest the vehicle's occupants for possession of marijuana. 133
After arresting the four men, the officer searched the vehicle and discovered cocaine. 134 In Belton, the Court specifically addressed the "proper
scope of a search of the interior of an automobile incident to a lawful
custodial arrest of its occupants. ' ' 35 In clarifying its holding in Chimel v.
California,136 the Belton court stated:
[W]hen a policeman has made a lawful custodial arrest
of the occupant of an automobile, he may, as a contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search the passenger
compartment of that automobile .... [T]he police may
also examine the contents of any containers found within
the passenger compartment .... Such a container may..
be searched whether it is open or closed ....
Furthermore, relying on United States v. Robinson, the Court held that a
container could be searched even if it "could hold neither a weapon nor
38
evidence of the criminal conduct for which the suspect was arrested.'
While a search is reasonable if made incident to a lawful arrest
based on probable cause, the Court, in Knowles v. Iowa, distinguished
the rule in Belton and concluded that a search incident to a citation violates the Fourth Amendment. 3 9 In that case, an officer stopped Patrick
131.
132.
133.

453 U.S. 454 (1981).
Id. at 455.

Id. at 455-56. Upon approaching the vehicle, the officer smelled burnt marijuana
and saw an envelope on the floor which he suspected of containing marijuana. Id.
134.
Id. at 456.
135.
Id. at 459.
136.
395 U.S. 752 (1969). The Chimel court held that a search incident to an arrest
may not stray beyond the area within the immediate control of the arrestee. Id. at 763.
However, as this principle pertains to automobiles, courts had difficulty determining
what exactly constituted the area within the arrestee's immediate control. Belton, 453
U.S. at 460. Belton modified the holding in Chimel only as it pertained to automobiles.
Id. at n.3
137. Belton, 453 U.S. at 460-61.
138. Id. at 461. (citing United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973)).
139.
525 U.S. 113, 118-19 (1998).
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Knowles and issued him a citation for speeding. 40 Following the citation, the officer conducted a full search of the car, which produced marijuana.1 4' In expressing its disapproval of the search, the Court relied on
Robinson in setting forth the two historical rationales for a search incident to arrest: (1) The need to disarm the suspect in order to take him
into custody, and (2) the need to preserve evidence for later use at
trial. 42 The Knowles court determined that neither 43of these rationales is
sufficient to justify a search incident to a citation.
The first historical rationale for a search incident to arrest takes
into account the need for officer safety. 44 Although this rationale is
"both legitimate and weighty,"'' 45 the Knowles court felt that "[t]he threat
to officer safety from issuing a traffic citation ...is a good deal less
than in the case of a custodial arrest.' 46 To a large extent, the concern
for officer safety during an arrest stems from the officer's extended exposure to the suspect. 47 In addition, the stress and uncertainty involved
in making an arrest result in a heightened danger to the arresting officer. 48 A traffic stop wherein a citation is issued, however, usually results
in a briefer encounter than a custodial arrest. 149 Thus, while a traffic stop
may justify a minimal intrusion, it does not justify "the often considerably greater intrusion attending a full field-type search."' 5 0
The second historical rationale for conducting a search incident
to arrest reflects the need to discover and preserve evidence.'' However,
the Court held that with respect to a traffic stop for speeding, once the
140. Id. at 114. Knowles was clocked driving 43 miles per hour in a 25 mile per hour
zone. Id.
141.
Id. Under IOWA CODE ANN. § 321.485(I)(a) (West 1997), the officer could
have arrested Knowles for speeding. Id. at 115. Nevertheless, under IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 805.1(1) (West Supp. 1997), the officer issued a citation. Id. However, IOWA CODE
ANN. § 805.1(4) (West Supp. 1997) explains that just because the officer issues a citation does not preclude him from conducting an otherwise lawful search. Id. The Iowa

Supreme Court had interpreted this provision as permitting officers to conduct a search
incident to a citation in any situation where the officer could have arrested the individual. Id. The officer in this case acted according to this interpretation and conducted a
search incident to a citation. Id.
142.
143.
144.

145.
146.
147.
148.

149.
150.
151.

Id. at 116; Robinson, 414 U.S. at 234.
Knowles, 525 U.S. at 117.
Id. at 116.
Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 110 (1997) (per curiam).
Knowles, 525 U.S. at 117.

Id.
Id.

Id.
Id.

Id.at 116.
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driver is issued a citation, "all the evidence necessary to prosecute that
offense ha[s] been obtained."1 52 According to the Court, "[n]o further
evidence of excessive speed [is] going to be found either on the person
of the offender or in the passenger compartment of the car."' 53 As to the
concern that the subject of a routine traffic stop may destroy evidence of
another, as yet undetected crime, the Court felt the likelihood that an
officer would
stumble onto evidence unrelated to the traffic offense was
54
remote.1
In addition to the principle permitting police officers to conduct a full search both of the vehicle and of the person, police may also
access the contents of a vehicle in the process of conducting an inventory search incident to a lawful custodial arrest. In South Dakota v. Opperman, the Supreme Court found inventory searches of automobiles to
be consistent with the Fourth Amendment.' 5 5 The Court explained that
neither the policies behind the warrant requirement nor the related concept of probable cause are implicated in an inventory search. 156 The
Court noted:
The standard of probable cause is peculiarly related to
criminal investigations, not routine, noncriminal procedures . . . .The probable-cause approach is unhelpful
when analysis centers upon the reasonableness of routine
administrative caretaking functions, particularly when no
claim is made that the protective procedures are a subter57
fuge for criminal investigations.
Thus, "an inventory search may be 'reasonable' under the Fourth
Amendment even though it is not conducted pursuant to a warrant based
' 58
upon probable cause."'
Id. at 118.
Id.
Id.
428 U.S. 364, 376 (1976). For more recent cases endorsing the holding in Opperman, see, e.g., Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 372-73 (1987) (acknowledging the
constitutionality of an inventory search and permitting evidence of criminal activity
152.
153.
154.
155.

discovered in the course of the search to be used in proving criminal charges); Florida v.
Wells, 495 U.S. 1, 4 (1990) (requiring inventory search to be conducted in a manner
consistent with police protocol, while allowing police sufficient latitude to determine
whether a container should be opened to verify its contents). See also Arkansas v. Sullivan, 121 S.Ct. 1876, 1878 (2001) (per curiam) (sustaining the lawfulness of an inventory search conducted by officers on the roadside following a lawful arrest).
156.
Opperman, 428 U.S. at 370 n.5.
157.

Id.

158.

Bertine, 479 U.S. at 371.
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The governmental interests advanced by an inventory search are
to protect the property of an arrestee while the property is in police custody, to insure the police against claims for lost, stolen, or destroyed
property, and to guard the police from danger. 5 9 In light of these strong
governmental interests, coupled with the diminished expectation of privacy in an automobile, the Court in Opperman upheld the constitutionality of the inventory search. 60 Though an inventory search is constitutional, this type of search "must not be a ruse for a general rummaging in
order to discover incriminating evidence."' 6' Neither should an inventory
search become "a purposeful and general means of discovering evidence
of crime."'' 62 Nevertheless, contraband or evidence discovered during the
course of an inventory search conducted according to established police
protocol may be properly submitted to prove criminal charges. 163
Judicial Treatment of Misdemeanor Arrests Prior to Atwater v. City of
Lago Vista
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Atwater, various lower
courts struggled with whether an arrest based upon probable cause for a
fine-only misdemeanor violated the Fourth Amendment. In Diaz v. City
of Fitchburg, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit,
applying the Garnertest, found that while an arrest for a fine-only misdemeanor is not a per se Fourth Amendment violation, there may be circumstances under which a custodial arrest for such an offense could violate the reasonableness requirement pertaining to seizures.' 64 In Goffv.
Bise, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit applied
the Graham test to determine that arresting officers used excessive force
in violation of the Fourth Amendment. 165 Adding to the three elements of
159.

Opperman, 428 U.S. at 369.

160. Id. at 376.
161.
Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1,4 (1990).
162. Bertine, 479 U.S. at 376.
163. Id. at 375-76. See also Arkansas v. Sullivan, 121 S. Ct. 1876 (2001) (per curiam)
(sustaining a roadside inventory search of an automobile following an arrest for traffic
offenses).
164.
176 F.3d 560, 563-64 (1st Cir. 1999). The City of Fitchburg had in effect an
ordinance that prohibits obstruction of public passages within the city. Id. at 561. A
maximum penalty for a violation of this ordinance is $300. Id. Officers stopped and
ordered a group congregated outside a residence to move. Id. Minutes after the group
refused to move, and without a warrant, "approximately ten members of the [Special
Response Team] arrived in an unmarked van and exited with guns drawn." Id. The
plaintiffs alleged that "they . . . were forced to the ground, frisked, handcuffed, and
thrown face down in the van on top of one another. Plaintiffs further allege that, en
route to the police station, they were threatened, punched, stepped and spit on, and subjected to racial insults." Id.
165.
173 F.3d 1068, 1073 (8th Cir. 1999). The Eighth Circuit determined that a rea-
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the Graham test, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in determining whether excessive force was used in the course of an
arrest for a fine-only ordinance, also considers whether
any other exigent
166
circumstances existed at the time of the arrest.
PRINCIPAL CASE
The Fifth CircuitPanel Decision

Initially, a unanimous Fifth Circuit panel decided Atwater v. City
of Lago Vista in favor of Atwater. 167 The three-judge panel undertook its
analysis of Atwater's claim that her arrest for failure to wear a seat belt
violated her Fourth Amendment rights by examining the reasonableness
standard. 6 Although the panel found no case where a court considered a
situation like Atwater's, the panel nonetheless proceeded based on the
principle that "there is a constitutional right to be free from unreasonable
seizures."'' 69 The panel further determined that, in addition to probable
cause, "any seizure which is conducted in an extraordinary manner or
which constitutes an extreme practice must meet the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment."' 7
The Fifth Circuit panel next analyzed the objective reasonableness of Atwater's arrest. In doing so, the panel described the Texas seat
belt law as paternalistic-a law that is "designed to protect a specific
individual from his own conduct, conduct which poses no threat to the
public at large."'' The panel explained that laws of this nature differ
from most traffic laws, the violation of which can have an immediate
impact on the public. 72 Though the panel acknowledged that under
Texas law an officer could make a warrantless arrest of a person found
committing a violation of the traffic code, the decision to arrest and the

sonable juror could have found that the subject of the arrest: (1) Was not suspected of
any crime when he was arrested, (2) did not resist efforts to arrest him, and (3) posed a
threat to no one. Id. at 1073-74.
166. Headwaters Forest Defense v. County of Humboldt, 240 F.3d 1185 (9th Cir.
2000). The Court found that the use of pepper spray to remove environmental protestors
engaged in acts of civil disobedience was not "reasonably necessary as a matter of law
in the totality of the circumstances." Id. at 1201.
167.
165 F.3d 380 (5th Cir. 1999).
168. Id. at 384.
169.
170.

Id.

Id.
171.
Id. at 385. Atwater was arrested for violating TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. §
545.413, requiring the driver, front-seat passenger, and children from ages four to fifteen to wear a seat belt. Id.
172. Atwater, 165 F.3d at 385.
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that arrest must be considered in light of the
circumstances surrounding
173
Fourth Amendment.
Respondents argued that Turek's actions were immune from civil
suit because he had probable cause to believe that Atwater had violated
the seat belt law. 174 Thus, according to the traffic code, nothing further
was required to arrest Atwater.175 In characterizing this argument as an
attempt to hide behind the law, the panel cited Knowles v. Iowa for the
proposition that simply because a statute permitting an arrest exists does
not "obviate the need for an independent Fourth Amendment analysis.,,' 176 The panel stated that a reading of the seat belt statute that does
not factor in the reasonableness requirement is "patently violative of the
Fourth Amendment .... ,,17 The panel determined that the Texas traffic
code did not authorize an arrest for every violation. 7 Reasonableness,
179
in the panel's view, was the key in determining whether to arrest.
The Fifth Circuit panel further attempted to clarify its evaluation
of the reasonableness of a seizure by distinguishing between major and
minor offenses. With a brief nod to history, the panel relied on the Supreme Court's ruling in Carroll v. United States in determining that
' 80
"[e]arly common law prohibited arrest for very minor offenses.'
173.
174.
175.
176.

Id.
Id. at 386.

Id.

Id. See also Grossman v. City of Portland, 33 F.3d 1200, 1209 (9th Cir. 1994)
("Where a statute authorizes official conduct which is patently violative of fundamental
constitutional principles, an officer who enforces that statute is not entitled to qualified
immunity.").
177. Atwater, 165 F.3d at 386.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 157 (1925). The Supreme Court in
Carroll addressed whether the warrantless search of an automobile and the subsequent
seizure of liquor found in the automobile violated the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 153-57.
The Court held that when a seizure is made without a warrant, the officer acts unlawfully unless he can demonstrate probable cause to justify the warrantless seizure. Id. at
156. In expressing this principle, the Carroll court rejected the argument that when an
officer makes a warrantless search leading to an arrest, "the right of seizure should be
limited by the common-law rule as to the circumstances justifying an arrest without a
warrant for a misdemeanor." Id. According to the Court, the reason for common-law
warrantless misdemeanor arrests "was promptly to suppress breaches of the peace." Id.
at 157. Even then, the Court explains, the arrest could not take place unless the breach
of the peace was committed in the officer's presence, or the officer reasonably believed
that a breach of the peace was about to be committed in his presence. Id. Due to the
mobile nature of an automobile, the Carrollcourt determined a better rule to be that
"[w]hen a man is legally arrested for an offense, whatever is found upon his person or in
his control which it is unlawful for him to have and which may be used to prove the
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Moreover, the panel relied on more recent Supreme Court decisions distinguishing minor and serious criminal offenses.' In particular, the
panel cited Welsh v. Wisconsin for the Supreme Court's holding that the
warrantless arrest
for the traffic offense committed in that case was un82
constitutional.1
In response to the respondent's argument that all seizures are
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment if based upon probable cause,
the panel explained that because Atwater's seizure was conducted in an
"extraordinary manner," the seizure must be analyzed in light of Whren
v. United States. 3 In light of the Supreme Court's holding in Whren, the
panel "easily conclude[d] that an arrest for a first-time seat belt offense
is indeed an extreme practice and a seizure conducted in an extraordinary manner which requires a balancing analysis to determine the reasonableness of the police activity."'8 4 In the balancing analysis that followed, the panel applied the Graham test and concluded that Atwater's
seizure was objectively unreasonable.8 5 According to the panel, the only
possible interest the government had in arresting Atwater was the enforcement of its seat belt law. 8 6 When weighed against the intrusion on
Atwater's privacy, the panel found "no factors existing in this case that
are appropriate for placement
on the side of the scales that would tilt
87
them in favor of seizure."'
The panel also analyzed Atwater's seizure based on Texas state
court decisions in situations involving traffic stops resulting in arrest."'
In all cases, "the arrest ensued only after some additional conduct occurred or some additional factor justifying arrest was revealed."' 8 9 The
panel found that when compared with the facts and circumstances in this
case, Texas state court precedent indicated that Turek's actions were
unreasonable.' 90 In limiting its decision to the facts of the case, the panel
offense may be seized and held as evidence ....
Id. at 158.
181.
Atwater, 165 F.3d at 386-87. See Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260, 266-67
(1973) (Stewart, J., concurring); Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 753 (1984); Payton
v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 587-90 (1980).
182.
For a discussion of Welsh v. Wisconsin, see supra notes 37-54 and accompanying text.
183.
Atwater, 165 F.3d at 387.
184.
Id.at 387.
185.
186.
187.

188.
State,
189.
190.

Id.
Id.

Id. at 388.
See, e.g., Madison v. State, 922 S.W.2d 610 (Tex. Ct. App. 1996); Valencia v.
820 S.W.2d 397 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991).
Atwater, 165 F.3d at 388.
Id.
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explained that Atwater in no way affected the body of law encompassed
in Whren that justified brief traffic stops for minor traffic violations.' 9'
Though traffic violations can become a serious matter affecting public
safety, the panel concluded that Atwater's seat belt violation was neither
so dangerous nor so serious as to justify her arrest.' 92
The Fifth Circuit En Banc Decision
Roughly eleven months following the Fifth Circuit panel's
unanimous decision in Atwater, the Fifth Circuit sitting en banc reversed
the panel's decision and held that when probable cause exists to believe
that an individual is committing an offense, the government's interests in
enforcing its laws outweigh the individual's privacy interests, and an
arrest of the individual is reasonable.' 93 Citing Tennessee v. Garner, the
court explained that the constitutionality of an arrest is determined by
balancing the nature and quality of the arrest against the importance of
any governmental interests alleged to justify the arrest. 194 Then, the court
laid the foundation for its decision by citing Whren for the proposition
that "[i]f an arrest is based on probable cause then 'with rare exceptions.
95
the result of that balancing is not in doubt."1
Relying on Whren v. United States, the Fifth Circuit stated that
an arrest based on probable cause is reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment unless the arrest is carried out in an extraordinary manner,
96
unusually harmful to the individual's privacy or physical interests.
Following its legal foundation, the court turned to the case's facts. Because neither party disputed the fact that Turek had probable cause to
arrest Atwater, and because the court determined that Atwater's arrest
was not conducted in an extraordinary manner, unusually harmful to her
interests, the court concluded that Atwater's arrest was reasonable under
97
the Fourth Amendment. 1
Though Atwater presented a common-law argument, the Fifth
Circuit refused to consider it, noting that Atwater had not previously
presented this alternative argument.'98 The Fifth Circuit explained that
191.

Id. at 389.

Id.
Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 195 F.3d 242, 245-46 (5th Cir. 1999) (en banc).
194.
Id. at 244 (citing Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8 (1985)).
195. Id. at 244 (quoting Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 817 (1996)) (omission
in original).
192.

193.

196.
197.

Atwater, 195 F.3d at 244-45 (citing Whren, 517 U.S. at 818).

Id. at 245-46.
198. Id. at 245 n.3. Atwater argued "that in determining whether her arrest violated
the Fourth Amendment, [the court] should follow the common law rule that existed
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the panel's treatment of the common law was done at the panel's election, as Atwater had not urged the panel to consider the common-law
argument. 199 Thus, because it was not properly raised previously, Atwater waived her rights to advance that argument in that stage of the proceedings.2 00
Though the majority based its opinion solely upon the probable
cause requirement coupled with an absence of extraordinary conduct in
the course of making an arrest, the dissenting opinions focused on the
need for a balancing analysis, in addition to probable cause, to determine
whether Atwater's arrest violated the Fourth Amendment. Judge Garza's
dissent acknowledged that while there are times when during a traffic
stop an officer discovers a situation or observes activity justifying an
arrest, such was not the case with Atwater.2 °1 Judge Garza focused on an
affidavit exposing Officer Turek's lack of maturity and failure of two
out of three psychological tests as insight into why Atwater's arrest occurred in the first place. 2 Judge Garza concluded his dissent by stating
that in his opinion, Atwater's arrest "was unreasonable
and therefore a
20 3
violation of the Constitution of the United States.,
Judge Wiener's dissenting opinion likewise disagreed with the
majority's analysis. For him, the majority's holding offended the Supreme Court's "longstanding pronouncements that every Fourth
Amendment analysis must turn upon a tripartite balancing of individual
interests, government interests, and the degree of certainty that the government interest will be furthered by the search or seizure at issue...
,204 In addition, Judge Wiener stated that the majority decision completely ignored the extreme facts of the case.20 5 Relying on Terry v.
Ohio,2 °6 Judge Wiener explained that when analyzing a Fourth Amendment seizure, a court must balance: "(1) [T]he government's purported
interest in effecting the ... seizure, (2) discounted by the degree of certainty that the ... seizure will in fact further the government's interest,
against (3) the extent of any infringement on the targeted individual's
constitutionally protected privacy and liberty interests. 2 7 In Judge Wiewhen the Fourth Amendment was promulgated, which she claim[ed] limited the circumstances under which a midemeanant could be arrested without a warrant." Id.
199. Atwater, 195 F.3d at 245 n.3.
200. Id.
201.
Id. at 246-47 (Garza, J., dissenting).
202.
Id. at 247 (Garza, J., dissenting).
203. Id. (Garza, J., dissenting).
204.
Atwater, 195 F.3d at 247 (Wiener, J., dissenting).
205. Id. (Wiener, J., dissenting).
206.
392 U.S. 1 (1968).
207. Atwater, 195 F.3d at 248-49 (Wiener, J., dissenting).
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ner's opinion, the majority mistakenly focused on the second factor.2 °s
To counter the majority's rigid, yet easily administrable rule that
an arrest based on probable cause is sufficient to satisfy the Fourth
Amendment, Judge Wiener, relying on the Supreme Court's holding in
Terry, proposed:
Before a police officer can constitutionally place an individual under full custodial arrest, even with probable
cause, the officer must have a plausible, articulable reason for effecting such an intrusion-a reason other than a
officer to punish the individual
desire on the part of the
20 9
for his or her conduct.
Judge Wiener believed this proposed rule to be just as easy to apply and
more respectful of the Fourth Amendment's guarantees than the majority's "rigid all-or-nothing" bright-line rule.21 °
Judge Dennis's dissent pointed out the majority's failure to incorporate into its analysis the common law regarding warrantless custodial arrests. 1 Citing Wyoming v. Houghton,2 12 Judge Dennis explained,
"When determining whether a particular governmental action violates
the Fourth Amendment, the Supreme Court has said that the first inquiry
is whether the action was regarded as an unlawful ... seizure under the
'
Having been concommon law when the amendment was framed."213
vinced by petitioner's briefs, and with reliance upon Carroll v. United
States and various historical commentaries, Judge Dennis concluded that
at common law, Atwater's actions would not have justified a full custodial arrest. 2 14 Furthermore, even if the common law were found to be
inconclusive, Judge Dennis stated that the balancing test required by the
Supreme Court and as conducted by the Fifth Circuit panel, clearly indicated that the promotion of legitimate governmental interests did not
208.

Id. at 249 (Wiener, J., dissenting).

209. Id. at 251 (Wiener, J., dissenting). In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), the Supreme Court held that to justify a particular intrusion upon an individual, the "police
officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with
rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion." id. at 21.
210. Atwater, 195 F.3d at 250-5 1 (Wiener, J., dissenting).
Atwater, 195 F.3d at 251 (Dennis, J., dissenting).
211.
212.
526 U.S. 295 (1999).
213. Atwater, 195 F.3d at 253 (Dennis, J.,dissenting).
214. Id. (Dennis, J., dissenting). Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925). For
historical commentaries, see 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 436-37
(E.A. Jelf ed., 3d. ed. 1938); SIR WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, BLACKSTONE's
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW 811-16 (Bernard C. Gavit ed. 1892).
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21 5
justify the intrusion upon Atwater's privacy and dignity.

The United States Supreme Court Decision
Following the Fifth Circuit's en banc decision in Atwater v. City
of Lago Vista, the United States Supreme Court granted Gail Atwater's
petition for certiorarito consider "whether the Fourth Amendment forbids a warrantless arrest for a minor criminal offense, such as a misdemeanor seatbelt violation punishable only by a fine.

216

Justice Souter, author of the majority opinion, began the Court's
analysis by examining founding-era common law to determine what traditional protections, if any, were afforded against unreasonable seizures. 217 The Court first determined whether a seizure such as Atwater
experienced was unlawful under the common law at the time the Fourth
Amendment was drafted.21 8 The Court's extensive review of prefounding English common law and founding-era common law led the
Court to conclude, "[tihis, therefore, simply is not a case in which the
claimant can point to a 'clear answer [that] existed in 1791 and has been
generally adhered to by the traditions of our society ever since.' 2 9 The
Supreme Court found "disagreement, not unanimity, among both the
,220
common-law jurists and the text-writers ....
In addition to its review of founding-era common law, the Court
conducted a complete review of statutory law from the founding era to
the present and concluded that "history, if not unequivocal, has expressed a decided, majority view . . . " that warrantless misdemeanor

arrests were appropriate regardless of whether the misdemeanant was
violent or posed the threat of violence. 22 Though Atwater presented a
very strong argument that common law forbade a warrantless misdemeanor arrest not involving breach of the peace, the Court's research,
which produced evidence in favor of, and in opposition to, Atwater's
argument, caused it to be unable to reach the conclusion Atwater
sought.22 2 Yet, rather than considering the common law to be dispositive
215.
216.

Atwater, 195 F.3d at 254 (Dennis, J., dissenting).
Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 121 S. Ct. 1536, 1541 (2001).

217.
218.

Id. at 1543.
Id.

219. Id. at 1552-53 (quoting County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 60
(1991) (alterations in original).
220.

Id. at 1546.

221.
Id. at 1553. But see id. at 1561 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (stating that the majority amply demonstrates in this case that history is inconclusive).
222.
Id. at 1543 ("Although [Atwater's] historical argument is by no means insubstantial, it ultimately fails.").
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of the issue in Atwater, the Court proceeded to address the feasibility of
a bright-line rule.
After concluding that history was not dispositive of the issue, the
Atwater's invitation to develop a new rule reflecting the
addressed
Court
"current balance between individual and societal interests by subjecting
particular contemporary circumstances to traditional standards of reasonableness. ,,223 Atwater proposed a rule prohibiting custodial arrest,
even if probable cause is present, when conviction for the offense could
not carry any jail time and when there is no compelling governmental
interest for immediate detention. 4 The Court declined Atwater's invitation, explaining that such a rule would result in the kind of case-by-case
analysis that its Fourth Amendment decisions have consistently rejected.225 Instead, the Court explained that it favors rules that are sufficiently clear and easily administered-rules that would survive judicial
second-guessing. 226 Though a bright-line rule permitting arrests based on
probable cause for misdemeanors and other minor criminal offenses
might result in a few needless and pointless arrests, "[m]ultiplied many
times over, the costs to society of such underenforcement could easily
outweigh the costs to defendants of being needlessly arrested and booked
...
...1127 In addition, the Court explained, one who is arrested can have
his case reviewed if he can make a colorable argument that the warrantless arrest was conducted in an extraordinary or unusually harmful
manner.

228

Thus, the Court established a bright-line rule: "If an officer has
probable cause to believe that an individual has committed even a very
minor criminal offense in his presence, he may, without violating the
Fourth Amendment, arrest the offender., 229 Furthermore, although Atwater's arrest was surely humiliating, it was not extraordinary, as understood in the context of the Fourth Amendment.23 °
According to Justice O'Connor, who authored the four-person
dissent, a full custodial arrest is "the quintessential seizure. 231 Thus, an
arrest made without a warrant must be reasonable under the Fourth
223.
224.
225.
226.

227.
228.
229.
230.
231.

573,

Id. at 1553.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1553-54.
Id. at 1556.
Id. at 1556-57.
Id. at 1557.
Id. at 1558.
Id. at 1560-61 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing Payton v. New York, 445 U.S.
585 (1980)).
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Amendment.232 Citing Pennsylvania v. Mimms, the dissenters stated that
the touchstone of the Court's Fourth Amendment analysis is always reasonableness in all the circumstances of the particular governmental invasion of an individual's personal security.233 The reasonableness of the
governmental activity is analyzed first by resorting to the founding-era
common law.234 Yet, when history is inconclusive, the dissent explains,
precedent requires the Court to evaluate the seizure under traditional
standards of reasonableness by assessing, on the one hand, the degree to
which the seizure intrudes upon an individual's privacy and, on the
other, the degree to which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate
governmental interests.2 35
Based on this framework, the dissent characterized the majority
holding as contrary to the principles that lie at the core of the Fourth
Amendment.2 36 First, the dissent pointed out that although the Supreme
Court had never considered the issue before it in Atwater, what it had
said about similar issues indicated disapproval.237 Second, the dissent
stated, since the common law as outlined in the majority opinion is unclear with respect to warrantless misdemeanor arrests, the Court must
engage in balancing the interests of the parties involved.2 38 While the
dissent acknowledged that probable cause is necessary to arrest for fineonly offenses, a realistic assessment of the interests implied by such an
arrest demonstrates that probable cause alone is not enough.239

232. Id. at 1561 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
233. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977)
(per curiam). In Mimms, the Supreme Court addressed whether an order to step out of a
car, issued after the driver had been lawfully detained, was reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment. Id. at 106-07. Prior to its analysis of the issue, the Court explained:
The touchstone of our analysis under the Fourth Amendment is always the
reasonableness in all the circumstances of the particular governmental invasion of a citizen's personal security. Reasonableness, of course, depends on a
balance between the public interest and the individual's right to personal security free from arbitrary interference by law officers.

Id. at 108-09 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
234. Atwater, 121 S. Ct. at 1561 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 13 (1985)).
235.
Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300
(1999)).
236.
Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260, 266-67
237.
(1973) (Stewart, J., concurring); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 238 n.2
(1973) (Powell, J., concurring)).
238.
Atwater, 121 S. Ct. at 1562 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
239.
Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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Though the majority relied on Whren, the dissent stated that
Whren is not at odds with the dissenting Justices' proposition. While
Whren dealt with traffic stops, a full custodial arrest is a much more severe intrusion on individual liberty and privacy than a traffic stop, and
therefore warrants consideration beyond probable cause. 240 Thus, the
dissent advanced Judge Wiener's proposed rule: An officer may arrest
for a fine-only misdemeanor only when probable cause exists and the
officer can articulate specific facts which, taken together, justify the arrest. 24' Absent these articulable reasons, the officer may only issue a
citation.24 2
The dissent next challenged the majority's expressed need for a
bright-line rule centered on probable cause. Probable cause is itself unclear and is based on a case-by-case situation.243 Moreover, the dissent
contended, Judge Wiener's proposed rule did not undermine the clear
and simple rule the majority desired. 2 " In acknowledging that Judge
Wiener's rule is based on the sometimes-imprecise Terry rule, the dissent justified the Terry rule's faults in terms of its adherence and sensitivity to Fourth Amendment reasonableness requirements.24 5
Following its proposal of Judge Wiener's rule, the dissent shifted
its focus to the majority's concerns that the bright-line rule eliminated
section 1983 liability for the misapplication of a constitutional standard.246 The dissent explained that the doctrine of qualified immunity
overcomes these fears by shielding government officials from civil liability for performing discretionary functions so long as their conduct
does not clearly violate statutory or constitutional guidelines of which a
reasonable person should be aware. 247 According to the dissent, Supreme
Court precedent was very clear in refusing to hold an officer personally
liable for the mistaken application of the probable cause requirement. 248
Though the appearance of potential liability may have substantial social
costs, the dissent contended that the Fourth Amendment should not be
240.

Id. at 1562-63 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1563-64 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
242.
Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
243.
Id. at 1564 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing Wong Sun v. United States, 371
U.S. 471, 479 (1963)).
244.
Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
245.
Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
246.
Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
247.
Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818
(1982)).
248.
Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641
(1987)). See also Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 507 (1978) (holding police not responsible for mere mistakes in judgment).
241.
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set aside in attempts to avoid these costs. 2 49 Constitutional requirements
should never be ignored merely to avoid the costs of their just administration.25 °
Finally, the dissent addressed the city's justifications for Atwater's arrest: (1) Enforcement of child safety laws and (2) encouraging
Atwater to appear for trial. 25' According to the dissent, the record was
clear that Atwater posed no threat to the community, was not a repeat
offender, accepted responsibility for her actions, and apologized.25 2 Furthermore, with respect to the goal of child welfare, Atwater's arrest was
counterproductive. 253 According to the record, the dissent stated, the arrest so severely frightened Atwater's two small children that they require
counseling, as they are terrified of the police.254 With respect to the
city's second justification for the arrest-encouraging Atwater to appear
for trial-the dissent pointed out that Atwater was a 16-year resident of
Lago Vista.255 Citing the Court's holding in Wyoming v. Houghton, the
dissent concluded that the city's interests in arresting Atwater did not
outweigh the invasion of her privacy and liberty. 6 The dissent admitted
that while an officer's subjective motivations for making a traffic stop
are not relevant considerations, the fact that such subjective motivations
are beyond the reach of the Court requires the Court to vigilantly ensure
that an officer's post-stop actions, which are within the Court's control,
comport with the requirements of the Fourth Amendment. 57
ANALYSIS

249.
250.
251.

Atwater, 121 S. Ct. at 1564-65 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1565 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
252.
Id. at 1565-66 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
253.
Id. at 1566 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
254.
Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
255.
Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
256.
Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting). In Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295 (1999),
the Supreme Court was presented the question of whether "police officers violate the
Fourth Amendment when they search a passenger's personal belongings inside an automobile that they have probable cause to believe contains contraband." Id. at 297. In
balancing the government's interest in the search against the degree of intrusiveness
upon personal privacy, the Houghton court conducted an historical analysis enabling it
to conclude that where probable cause exists "to search for contraband in a car, it is
reasonable for ... officers ... to examine packages and containers without a showing of
individualized probable cause for each one." Id. at 302. Thus, a passenger's personal
belongings that are in the car are properly within the scope of a search. Id. Furthermore,
like drivers, passengers of automobiles enjoy considerably diminished expectations of
privacy. Id. at 304-05.
257. Atwater, 121 S. Ct. at 1567 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing Whren v. United
States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996)).
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Atwater v. City of Lago Vista is a difficult case. And, as is often
true, difficult cases make bad law. Atwater raises two difficult issues.
The first is the bright-line rule. The second is the decision's effect on the
future of Fourth Amendment law.
The Bright-line Rule
Though the Court was faced with an arrest for a fine-only traffic
violation, the Court decided to expand its focus to include all misdemeanors and other minor traffic violations. The Court's decision to create a new rule encompassing a broad spectrum of minor criminal offenses was appropriate. However, the rule upon which the majority settled is inappropriate because it inaccurately reflects the Supreme Court's
Fourth Amendment precedent and denied Ms. Atwater the justice she
sought before the Court.2" 8
1.

The Need for a Bright-line Rule

With respect to establishing a bright-line rule, the majority explained that the Supreme Court has "traditionally recognized that a responsible Fourth Amendment balance is not well served by standards
requiring sensitive, case-by-case determinations of government need,
lest every discretionary judgment in the field be converted into an occa' Because officers are often required to
sion for constitutional review."259
apply the Fourth Amendment on the spur of the moment, the Court concluded that any attempt to strike a reasonable balance between government and private interests must "credit the government's side with an
essential interest in readily administrable rules. 2 60 This position appears
to be consistent with an abundance of Supreme Court precedent explaining the need to fashion bright-line rules in its Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. For instance, in United States v. Robinson, the Court stated
that a case-by-case analysis rule for determining the authority of an officer to search incident to a lawful arrest is not in keeping with Fourth
258. The majority acknowledged, "If we were to derive a rule exclusively to address
the uncontested facts of this case, Atwater might well prevail .... Atwater's claim to
live free of pointless indignity and confinement clearly outweighs anything the City can
raise against it specific to her case." Atwater, 121 S. Ct. at 1553. However, the majority's desire to establish a bright-line rule governing arrests for all minor criminal offenses effectively "cloak[ed] the pointless indignity that Gail Atwater suffered with the
mantle of reasonableness." Id. at 1567 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). For the dissenters,
because Atwater's humiliation outweighed any governmental interest in effecting the
arrest, "the Fourth Amendment inquiry ends there." Id. at 1566 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
Atwater, 121 S. Ct. at 1553.
259.
260. Id. at 1553-54.
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Amendment precedent. 26' The Court held that the Fourth Amendment
does not require quick ad hoc judgments made by officers to be "broken
down in each instance into an analysis of each step in the search. 262
Again in New York v. Belton, the Court held that the absence of a
straightforward rule poses difficulties for courts seeking to apply Fourth
Amendment law.263 Finally, in Dunaway v. New York, the Court posited,
"A single, familiar standard is essential to guide police officers, who
have only limited time and expertise to reflect on and balance the social
and individual interests involved in the specific circumstances they confront.
2. Probable Cause v. Reasonableness
The great debate in Atwater revolves around whether probable
cause should be the controlling standard to justify an arrest for a minor
criminal offense, or whether, in addition to probable cause, some form of
reasonableness must also be present for an arrest to pass constitutional
muster. This debate is not unique to the Supreme Court. The very structure of the Fourth Amendment has led to great scholarly debate over
whether the Reasonableness Clause retains independent vitality or
whether it is inextricably tied to the Warrant Clause. 265 A basic principle
of Fourth Amendment law requires an officer effecting a warrantless
arrest for a fine-only offense to act based upon probable cause. For
years, the Supreme Court has held that warrantless arrests may be justified upon a showing of probable cause.266 On the other hand, the Su267
preme Court has required that such arrests must also be reasonable.
For instance, in Pennsylvania v. Mimms, the Court clearly stated, "The
261.

414 U.S. 218,235 (1973).

262.

Id.
453 U.S. 454, 458 (1981).

263.

442 U.S. 200, 213-214 (1979).
265. Timothy P. O'Neill, Beyond Privacy, Beyond Probable Cause, Beyond the
Fourth Amendment: New Strategiesfor Fighting Pretext Arrests, 69 U. COLO. L. REV.
693, 706-13 (1998) (discussing various views with respect to whether the Reasonableness Clause and the Warrant Clause are independent or interrelated).
266. See, e.g., United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 431-32 (1976) (upholding
warrantless felony arrest based upon probable cause and in a public place); Florida v.
White, 526 U.S. 559 (1999) (same); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 590 n.30 (1980)
(holding that an officer may arrest without a warrant for a misdemeanor or felony committed in his presence); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 15 (1948) (same); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 156 (1925) (holding that a police officer may make a
misdemeanor arrest without a warrant if the offense was committed in his presence).
267.
See, e.g., Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1985) (holding that the reasonableness of an intrusion depends not only on when a seizure is made, but also upon how
it is carried out); United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 895 (1975) (same). Accord Terry
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 28-29 (1968).
264.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol2/iss1/5

32

2002

Cantrell: Fourth Amendment Seizure - Getting Cuffed and Stuffed for Not Wea
CASE NOTE

touchstone of our analysis under the Fourth Amendment is always the
reasonableness in all the circumstances of the particular governmental
invasion of a citizen's personal security., 268 Furthermore, the Court recently announced in Wyoming v. Houghton that when a historical analysis of Fourth Amendment law proves inconclusive, the Court must
"evaluate the . . . seizure under traditional standards of reasonableness
by assessing, on the one hand, the degree to which it intrudes upon an
individual's privacy and, on the other, the degree to which it is needed
for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests. 269
The majority in Atwater held that "[i]f an officer has probable
cause to believe that an individual has committed even a very minor
criminal offense in his presence, he may, without violating the Fourth
Amendment, arrest the offender., 270 The majority justified its bright-line
rule for two reasons. First, the requirement that warrantless arrests be
based upon probable cause is generally considered to be beyond dispute.271 Furthermore, the oft-cited common law rule that a warrantless
misdemeanor arrest is justifiable under the Fourth Amendment if based
upon probable cause and if committed in the officer's presence lends
support to the majority position. 72 Second, the Court expressed the need
for an easily administrable rule.2 73 Because the Fourth Amendment is
often applied in an instant, both police officers and citizens alike would
greatly benefit from a clear-cut rule describing exactly the offenses for
which an officer may arrest without a warrant if committed in the offi27
these reasons, the Court dismissed Atwater's
cer's presence. 274 Based on275
rules.
bright-line
proposed
In contrast, the dissent contended that the rule announced by the
majority "is not only unsupported by our precedent, but runs contrary to
the principles that lie at the core of the Fourth Amendment., 276 For the
dissent, "[w]hen a full custodial arrest is effected without a warrant, the
plain language of the Fourth Amendment requires that the arrest be reasonable." 277 Though the dissent recognized the value of clarity in Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence, the dissenting Justices contended that clarity
268.
ted).
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.

275.
276.
277.

434 U.S. 106, 108-09 (1977) (per curiam) (internal quotations and citation omit526 U.S. 295, 300 (1999).
Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 121 S. Ct. 1536, 1557 (2001).
Id.
Id. at 1553-54.
Id. at 1554.
Id.
Id. at 1555.
Id. at 1561 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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"by no means trumps the values of liberty and privacy at the heart of the
Amendment's protections.' 27 '
Though readily administrable rules are important, the Court has
not always placed the concern for administrative ease above individual
protections. For instance, in Tennessee v. Garner, the Court required
police officers to take into account the totality of the circumstances before making a particular sort of search or seizure. 279 Thus, the Court concluded, the use of deadly force is not justified "where the suspect poses
no immediate threat to the officer and no threat to others ... ,,280 However, the Court refused to believe that this rule would require police to
make impossible, split second evaluations of unknowable facts. 28 ' Relying upon Terry v. Ohio, the Garner court admitted that while there are
practical difficulties associated with attempting to assess the suspect's
dangerousness, "similarly difficult judgments must be made by the police in equally uncertain circumstances.""2 2 One such judgment to which
the Supreme Court refers is "the highly technical felony/misdemeanor
distinction .... Such a distinction, the Court held, is "equally, if not
more, difficult to apply in the field., 28 4 Nevertheless, the Court determined that from time to time difficult judgments must be made. Yet, the
majority in Atwater was unwilling to require officers to make these types
of distinctions any longer. Instead, the majority felt it necessary to fashion a bright-line rule eliminating the judgment calls that police had been
making for years.
The judgment-based rule upon which the Garner court relied is
found in Terry v. Ohio.28 5 The familiar Terry Doctrine states:

[W]here a police officer observes unusual conduct which
leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous, where in the course of investigating this
behavior he identifies himself as a policeman and makes
reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in the initial
stages of the encounter serves to dispel his reasonable
278.
279.
280.
281.

Id. at 1564 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
471 U.S. I, 8-9 (1985).
Id. at I1.
Id. at 20.

282.
283.
284.

Id.
Id.
Id.

285.

392 U.S. 1 (1968).
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fear for his own or others' safety, he is entitled for the
protection of himself and others in the area to conduct a
carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such perdiscover weapons which might be
sons in an attempt to
28 6
used to assault him.
In other words, the officer must act on articulable inferences, not a mere
hunch, to justify a search of the suspect's outer clothing.
Over the years since Terry was decided, the rule has been administered with varying success. Yet, as the dissent pointed out, "What the
Terry rule lacks in precision it makes up for in fidelity to the Fourth
Amendment's command of reasonableness and sensitivity to the competing values protected by that Amendment., 287 While not all-inclusive,
these two rules are examples of how the Supreme Court has construed
the Fourth Amendment balancing of interests to burden the government
with reasonableness requirements and judgment calls. Other than the
fact, as the majority correctly concludes, that Terry also favors a "more
finely tuned approach to the Fourth Amendment . . . " than a case-bycase determination, Terry lends no further support to the majority position288 Unlike the rule announced in Atwater, the Terry rule requires
officers in Fourth Amendment situations to reasonably articulate the
need for a search. The Atwater rule, on the other hand, contemplates no
such requirement.
With the requirements of the Terry rule in mind, and knowing of
the Supreme Court's apparent satisfaction with the rule's ease of administrability, it is difficult to understand the majority's neglect of the rule
proposed by Judge Wiener in the Fifth Circuit dissent. Judge Wiener's
rule "require[s] that when there is probable cause to believe that a fineonly offense has been committed, the police officer should issue a citation unless the officer is 'able to point to specific and articulable facts
which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant [the additional] intrusion' of a full custodial arrest." 8 9 While
the majority addressed a number of Atwater's proposed bright-line rules,
which are admittedly flawed, the majority completely failed to address
the relative ease with which a modified Terry rule, such as the dissent
proposed, could be administered. Instead, the majority established probable cause as the sole requirement to justify a warrantless arrest for a
286.

Id. at 30.

287.

Atwater, 121 S. Ct. at 1564 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).

288. Atwater, 121 S. Ct. at 1554 n.16.
289. Id. at 1563-64 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 21) (alterations in original).
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fine-only misdemeanor. Perhaps the reason for the majority's willingness to forgo any sort of reasonableness requirement lies in the holding
of Whren v. United States.
3.

The Problem with Whren v. United States

One of the problems in Atwater is the Supreme Court's decision
in Whren v. United States. Though the majority never expressly relied on
the holding in Whren, that holding nonetheless enabled the majority to
reach its decision in Atwater. In Whren, the Supreme Court inappropriately equated probable cause with reasonableness. The Whren court acknowledged that "in principle every Fourth Amendment case, since it
turns upon a 'reasonableness' determination, involves a balancing of all
'
relevant factors."29
However, the Court seemed to say that in practice
"the result of that balancing is not in doubt where the search or seizure is
based upon probable cause."2' 91
The decision in Whren does not square well with either the traditional definition of probable cause or the Court's reasonableness requirements. Probable cause is traditionally defined as encompassing
practical and factual considerations of everyday life on which reasonable
and prudent men act. 292 Reasonableness, on the other hand, as established in Welsh v. Wisconsin, Tennessee v. Garner, and Graham v. Connor has very specific requirements that are not found in a probable cause
determination, but have been created in addition to it. 293 One such reasonableness requirement is the severity of the offense. 9 Another is
whether the offender has threatened or poses an immediate threat to the
safety of officers or others. 295 A third requirement is whether the offender poses a flight risk. 296 Finally, even if these three elements are satisfied, the Supreme Court has indicated that the reasonableness of a
Fourth Amendment seizure depends upon whether the totality of the circumstances justifies the seizure.297
Clearly, the Supreme Court has intended that these considerations be made in addition to the probable cause requirement when determining whether an arrest is reasonable. For instance, in Graham,
290.

Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 817 (1996) (emphasis added).

291.

Id.

292.
293.
(1985);
294.
295.
296.
297.

Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949).
Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740 (1984); Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1
Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989).
Welsh, 466 U.S. at 753; Graham, 490 U.S. at 396.
Garner,471 U.S. at 11; Graham, 490 U.S. at 396.
Graham, 490 U.S. at 396.
Garner,471 U.S. at 8-9; Graham, 490 U.S. at 396-97.
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Garner, and Welsh, the officers had probable cause to make a Fourth
Amendment seizure. Nevertheless, the Court held in each case that the
methods used to conduct the seizure were unreasonable. Thus, the
Court's statement in Whren that probable cause takes reasonableness
into account appears to be at odds with significant precedent.
The Future of Fourth Amendment Law
One of the great concerns following the pronouncement of the
Atwater rule is its potential effect on the body of Fourth Amendment law
pertaining to roving-patrol stops. In Delaware v. Prouse, the Supreme
Court concluded:
[E]xcept in those situations in which there is at least articulable and reasonable suspicion that a motorist is unlicensed or that an automobile is not registered, or that either the vehicle or an occupant is otherwise subject to
seizure for violation of law, stopping an automobile and
detaining the driver in order to check his driver's license
and the registration of the automobile are unreasonable
under the Fourth Amendment.29 8
The purpose of a rule prohibiting indiscriminate roving-patrol stops is to
limit "the unbridled discretion of police officers. 299
Following the announcement of the Atwater rule, the prohibition
against indiscriminate roving-patrol stops has virtually disappeared for
two reasons. First, the pervasiveness with which society in general violates traffic laws will likely provide police with any number of legitimate reasons for stopping a motorist, ranging from exceeding the speed
limit by one mile per hour to failing to signal a lane change or failing to
perform a proper left turn. 3° Second, the Supreme Court's consistent
refusal to inquire into the detaining officer's mind allows the officer to
use an insignificant, yet legitimate reason as a pretext to properly stop
the driver and, in the course of such detention, request the information
the officer suspects the driver is lacking.
Closely aligned with the roving-patrol stop is the roadblock or
checkpoint. In fact, the Prouse court suggested that a roadblock involving the "[q]uestioning of all oncoming traffic . . ." is a possible solution
298.

440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979).

299.

Id.

300.
case.

This passage should not be read to condone violations of the law. Such is not the
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to the roving-patrol stop.3 °1 Although a checkpoint may be an effective
means of eliminating dangerous circumstances from a state's highways,
and though it may require less effort in its application than indiscriminate roving-patrol stops, for the reasons mentioned above, police may
now avoid the checkpoint alternative altogether.
Concerns similar to those expressed in prohibiting roving-patrol
stops arise when officers conduct pretextual stops based on racial profiling and similar practices. "Indeed, as the recent debate over racial profiling demonstrates all too clearly, a relatively minor traffic infraction may
often serve as an excuse for stopping and harassing an individual. 3 °2
The Court has clearly said that it does not sanction pretextual stops
based on racial profiling.0 3 However, the Supreme Court's holding in
Whren, followed by its decision in Atwater, calls into question the
Court's commitment to police these pretextual stops. From the facts in
Whren, it is certainly possible that the traffic stop at issue in that case
was based upon subjective motivations. 30 4 However, the Whren court
dismissed petitioner's allegations regarding the pretextual stop as not
having been brought under the proper Amendment to the Constitution. 30 5
The Court noted that pretextual stop claims implicate officers' subjective
intentions in the discriminatory application of the law.30 6 Thus, the
Whren court held, such claims must be brought under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and not the Fourth Amendment, because inquiring into subjective intentions plays no role in ordinary, probable-cause analysis. 30 7 Now, combining the rule in Atwater
with the Supreme Court's refusal to inquire into an officer's subjective
301.
Prouse, 440 U.S. at 663. See also Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496
U.S. 444, 447, 455 (1990) (ruling that sobriety checkpoints are reasonable and serve a
legitimate public interest); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 566 (1976)
(holding that "stops for brief questioning routinely conducted at permanent checkpoints" are appropriate under the Fourth Amendment). But cf. City of Indianapolis v.
Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 44 (2000) (holding that a checkpoint designed to interdict unlawful drugs violates the Fourth Amendment).
302. Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 121 S. Ct. 1536, 1567 (2001) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
303. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996). The Whren Court "agree[d]
with petitioners that the Constitution prohibits selective enforcement of the law based
on considerations such as race." Id. However, the Court stated that claims alleging pretextual stops based on racial profiling should be brought under the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, as such claims have no place in "ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis." Id.
304.
For a discussion of Whren v. United States, see supra notes 102-116 and
accompanying text.
305.
Whren, 517 U.S. at 813.
306. Id.
307.

Id.
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motivations for making a traffic stop, "the arsenal available to any officer" desiring to harass an individual because of his race, sex, or other
a full arrest and the searches permissible
genetic qualities, "extends 3 to
08
arrest.
that
to
concomitant
Though it may raise concern that Atwater seemingly grants police an ability to evade longstanding Fourth Amendment principles pertaining to roadblocks and pretextual stops, these acts pale in comparison
to police officers' new unfettered ability to stop virtually every motorist
on the road. Under the Atwater rule, when a police officer has probable
cause to suspect that a traffic violation has occurred, "the officer may
stop the car, arrest the driver, search the driver, search the entire passenger compartment of the car including any purse or package inside, and
impound the car and inventory all of its contents. 30 9 In fact, the Supreme Court's recent decision in Arkansas v. Sullivan extended police
authority in an Atwater situation to permit officers to conduct an inventory search along the roadside.3 1°
Consistent with the Atwater rule's broadening of police powers,
the rule all but nullifies the holding in Knowles v. Iowa. In Knowles, the
Supreme Court held as unconstitutional an Iowa statute permitting officers to conduct a full-scale search incident to issuing a citation.31 ' Under
Atwater, however, an officer witnessing a violation of a traffic ordinance
may, in lieu of issuing a citation, arrest the offending driver and lawfully
conduct a full-scale search of the driver and the vehicle's passenger
compartment, including containers and personal belongings.3" 2 If the
search incident to arrest proves fruitless, the arresting officer may simply
change his mind and send the motorist on his way with a citation.
Though much of this case note is focused on Fourth Amendment
searches and seizures for violations of traffic laws, the majority's decision in Atwater clearly indicates that the scope of such a rule is not limited to minor traffic offenses, but includes all misdemeanors.31 3 Thus, a
person caught littering or jaywalking may, under Atwater, properly be
arrested, searched, forced to submit to the booking process, and placed
308. Atwater, 121 S. Ct. 1567 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). See also Whren, 517 U.S. at
813 (holding that an officer's subjective motivations for making a traffic stop are not
relevant).
309. Atwater, 121 S. Ct. at 1567 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted).
310. Arkansas v. Sullivan, 121 S. Ct. 1876, 1878 (2001).
525 U.S. 113, 117(1998).
311.
312. Such a search incident to a lawful arrest is condoned by New York v. Belton, 453
U.S. 454 (1981), and by Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295 (1999).
313. Atwater, 121 S. Ct. at 1557.
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in a holding cell for up to forty-eight hours before being taken before a
magistrate for arraignment. When seen in this context, the majority's
refusal to consider the need for a reasonableness requirement is all the
more bewildering.
Although Atwater is the law, it nevertheless remains difficult to
comprehend how any governmental interest served by laws against jaywalking and littering justifies such an extensive intrusion into personal
privacy. Admittedly, Atwater v. City of Lago Vista poses difficult questions requiring well-reasoned answers. However, hiding behind the established principle of probable cause will accomplish nothing but create
more problems. For instance, the majority seems to draw support for its
decision based on the fact that "there is simply no evidence of widespread abuse of minor-offense arrest authority. 31 4 Yet, shortly after announcing its decision in Atwater, the Supreme Court was unmoved by
the Arkansas Supreme Court's unwillingness "to sanction conduct where
a police officer can trail a targeted vehicle with a driver merely suspected of criminal activity, wait for the driver to exceed the speed limit
by one mile per hour, arrest the driver for speeding, and conduct a full315
blown inventory search for the vehicle with impunity.,
Although the United States Supreme Court in a per curiam opinion reversed the Arkansas Supreme Court decision, the reversal did not
come without reflection upon the majority's statements in Atwater pertaining to a "dearth of horribles demanding redress., 31 6 In a four-person
concurring opinion in Arkansas v. Sullivan, the dissenting Justices in
Atwater expressed their support for the majority decision as reflecting
the Supreme Court's current case law. 317 However, the four Justices
opined that should the Atwater decision result in "anything like an epidemic of unnecessary minor-offense arrests," their318 hope was that the
Supreme Court "will consider its recent precedent.,
CONCLUSION
Although the Supreme Court in Atwater v. City of Lago Vista

314.
Id. at 1557 n.25. The majority also said that while there may be a few cases of
"comparably foolish arrests," it was sure that "the country is not confronting anything
like an epidemic of unnecessary minor-offense arrests." Id. at 1557. The lack of such an
epidemic capped the majority's reasoning for rejecting any proposal to modify the probable cause requirement. Id.
315.
Arkansas v. Sullivan, 16 S.W.3d 551, 552 (2000).
316. Atwater, 121 S. Ct. at 1557 (quoted text).
317.
Arkansas v. Sullivan, 121 S. Ct. 1876, 1879 (2001).
318.
Id.
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faced a daunting task of determining where to draw the line with respect
to warrantless arrests, the difficulty of the task should not excuse the
majority's refusal to require that, in addition to probable cause, the arrest
comport with standards of reasonableness. As has been shown, Supreme
Court precedent is replete with examples of the Court requiring an arrest
based upon probable cause to also fall within the confines of the Fourth
Amendment's reasonableness requirement. Nevertheless, in favor of an
easily administrable bright-line rule, the Court turned its back on the
individual protections guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment. Though a
"dearth of horribles" has not been reported since the Atwater decision
came down on April 24, 2001, the concurring opinion in Arkansas v.
Sullivan indicates that perhaps such fears should not yet be laid to rest.
Moreover, the Atwater decision may become a cankerous rust that
slowly erodes the solid framework of years of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Atwater now places the stamp of constitutional approval upon
the actions of the Officer Tureks of the world who, to harass and embarrass unsuspecting motorists, delight in "cuffing and stuffing" them for
even the most minor of offenses.
SAM CANTRELL
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